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Abstract
In this paper, we re-examine the role of economic self-interest in
shaping people’s attitudes towards immigration, using data from the
European Social Survey 2002/2003. Compared to the existing litera-
ture, there are two main contributions of the present paper. First, we
develop a more powerful test of the hypothesis that a positive rela-
tionship between education and attitudes towards immigration reflects
economic self-interest in the labour market. Second, we develop an al-
ternative and more direct test of whether economic self-interest mat-
ters for people’s attitudes towards immigration. We find that while
the "original" relationship between education and attitudes found in
the literature is unlikely to reflect economic self-interest, there is con-
siderable evidence of economic self-interest when using the more direct
test.
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1 Introduction
Are people’s attitudes towards immigration determined by economic self-
interest? This view has been advanced and backed empirically in previous
studies, see, e.g., Scheve and Slaughter (2001) and Mayda (2005). These
studies have found that more education is strongly related with a more pos-
itive attitude towards immigration. This relationship is interpreted as sup-
porting the hypothesis that attitudes are — at least in part — determined by
economic self-interest, since the factor-proportions analysis model1 suggests
that, in particular, less educated natives will suﬀer from competition with
immigrants in the labour market.
Recent studies have questioned this interpretation. In an analysis ap-
plying data on attitudes in the UK, Dustmann and Preston (2004a) find
that the greater hostility towards further immigration among lower educated
workers is mainly a result of racial concerns, whereas Hainmueller and Hiscox
(2005), using European data, find that the relationship between education
and attitudes has very little (if anything) to do with fears of labour market
competition.
This paper has two main contributions. First, we develop a more powerful
test of the hypothesis that the positive relationship between education and
attitudes towards immigration reflects economic self-interest in the labour
market, utilizing the detailed information about attitudes towards diﬀer-
ent types of immigration in the European Social Survey (ESS) 2002/2003.
Second, we develop an alternative and more direct test of whether economic
1In the following we use the terminology that the "factor-proportions analysis model"
is a model where relative factor prices depend on relative factor supplies.
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self-interest matters for people’s attitudes towards immigration exploiting the
unique information in ESS 2002/3 about people’s perceptions of the economic
consequences of immigration. We find that while the "original" relationship
between education and attitudes is unlikely to reflect economic self-interest,
there is considerable evidence of economic self-interest when using the more
direct test.
First, if the relationship between education and attitudes reflects eco-
nomic self-interest, then — according to the factor-proportions analysis model
— educated natives should be relatively more positive towards low-skilled im-
migration relative to high-skilled immigration than less educated natives,
and vice versa. Using data from the EU-15 countries and Norway, we find a
strong positive relationship between education and general attitudes towards
immigration like in previous studies. However, when considering attitudes
towards diﬀerent types of immigration, we do not find that education is pos-
itively related with a relatively more positive attitude towards low-skilled
immigration. This leads us to reject the hypothesis that the positive rela-
tionship between education and attitudes reflects economic self-interest in
the labour market.
Second, both the original and the more powerful test implicitly assume
that people’s perceptions of the economic consequences of immigration match
those of the factor-proportions analysis model. As a consequence, they ac-
tually test a composite hypothesis of whether people believe in a specific
economic model and have attitudes consistent with economic self-interest.
However, as we show in this paper, people do in fact have very diﬀerent per-
ceptions of the economic consequences of immigration, and therefore testing
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this composite hypothesis may not reveal much about the importance of eco-
nomic self-interest. Instead, a more appropriate test should condition on
people’s perceptions. We develop such a test, using the unique questions
in the ESS 2002/3 concerning people’s perceptions of the economic conse-
quences of immigration.
As an example, we ask: "Given that an individual perceive immigration
to lower wages, does that make him/her more hostile towards immigration
if he/she is likely to be aﬀected by this?" Taking this approach, we find
considerable evidence of economic self-interest playing a role among those
who believe that immigration disproportionately hurts the poor, puts public
expenditures under pressure, take jobs away, and/or lowers wages, as those
most likely to be harmed by these eﬀects are more opposed to immigration.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present
a simple model of the economic eﬀects of immigration on diﬀerent types of
natives. In Section 3, we describe the data. Section 4 contains the details
and the results of the empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
It is well known that immigration does not necessarily have an adverse impact
on any group in the labour market, see, e.g., Scheve and Slaughter (2001).
First, if the skill-composition of immigrants is similar to the skill-composition
of natives, immigration simply implies that the size of the economy increases,
without any eﬀects on factor payments. Second, even if the skill-composition
of immigrants is diﬀerent from that of natives, factor prices do not necessarily
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respond to immigration. This is the case in a standard Heckscher-Ohlin
model when the number of traded goods exceeds or equals the number of
production factors.
However, the Heckscher-Ohlin model assumes that there is full mobility
of production factors across sectors. While this may be a reasonable assump-
tion in the longer run, production factors are not fully mobile in the short
run. Therefore, a one sector factor-proportions analysis model — where im-
migration does influence factor prices — may be better able to capture some
of the short run consequences of immigration, see also Scheve and Slaughter
(2001).
Assume that there is one final good, Y , and three production factors:
unskilled labour, L, skilled labour, S, and capital, K. The eﬀects of im-
migration on the payments to the three production factors depend on the
degree of substitution between the production factors. To simplify, consider
a simple CES production function:
Y = (Lσ +Kσ + Sσ)
1
σ , −∞ < σ < 1 (1)
where the elasticity of substitution between each of the three production
factors equals 1
1−σ .
We assume that there is an exogenous supply of the three production
factors. Moreover, by assuming full employment of all production factors,
and that these are paid the value of their marginal product, we find that:
∂wL
∂L
< 0, ∂wS
∂L
> 0, ∂r
∂L
> 0 (2)
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∂wL
∂S
> 0,
∂wS
∂S
< 0,
∂r
∂S
>
∂r
∂L
(3)
where r is the return to capital, wL is the wage of unskilled labour, and
wS is the wage of skilled labour. We see that an increase in the supply
of one production factor decreases the payment to this factor but increases
the payments to the other factors. Moreover, we see that an increase in
the supply of skilled labour has a bigger positive impact on the payment
to capital than an increase in the supply of unskilled labour, assuming that
the marginal productivity of skilled labour is higher than that of unskilled
labour.
In the empirical part of this paper, we apply data for European countries.
It is often argued that, due to minimum wages and other institutions, wages
in Europe are rigid and do not adjust to bring the labour market into equi-
librium. If we assume that there is a binding minimum wage for unskilled
labour, i.e., wL = wL, we find that:
∂u
∂L
> 0,
∂wS
∂L
= 0,
∂r
∂L
= 0 (4)
∂u
∂S
< 0, ∂wS
∂S
< 0, ∂r
∂S
> 0 (5)
where u is the unemployment rate. In this case, an increase in the supply
of unskilled labour does not aﬀect the payments to any of the production
factors. The only direct eﬀect on the labour market is an increase in the
unemployment rate. As in the case of fully flexible wages, an increase in the
supply of skilled labour implies that the wage of skilled labour decreases while
the return to capital increases. Moreover, since an increase in the supply of
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skilled labour tends to increase the marginal productivity of unskilled labour,
the unemployment rate tends to decrease.
In sum, these results imply the following according to the model: Un-
skilled workers should oppose immigration of unskilled labour but favour
immigration of skilled labour. For skilled workers the opposite should hold.
Employers should be positive towards immigration of both skilled and un-
skilled labour, but they should favour skilled labour relative to unskilled
labour. Finally, the unemployed should oppose immigration of low-skilled
labour, but favour immigration of skilled labour.
How robust are these results with respect to other specifications of the
production function? The result that workers should tend to oppose im-
migration of workers of a similar type holds with any specification of the
production function as long as there is diminishing returns to this produc-
tion factor. The results showing how one production factor is aﬀected by
an increase in the supply of another production factor depend on the spe-
cific production function and, in particular, the elasticities of substitution
between the three production factors. In a recent study by Krusell et al.
(2000), it has been found that capital-skill complementarity is an important
factor behind the increase in the relative demand for skilled labour in recent
decades. However, capital-skill complementarity would only strengthen the
result that employers tend to be more positive towards immigration of skilled
labour.
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3 Data
We use data from the European Social Survey (ESS) 2002/2003 which cov-
ers 22 European and associated countries. However, we only use data for
the EU-15 and Norway as these countries constitute a relatively homogenous
group with respect to income and skill levels. The ESS interviews about
2,000 randomly selected persons aged 15 years or more in each country.2
The 2002/2003 wave contains a special module with a number of questions
about immigration. This module is unique in the sense that it contains
questions about attitudes towards diﬀerent types of immigration as well as
the respondent’s understanding of the economic implications of immigra-
tion. Furthermore, the survey holds information about people’s educational
background, labour market association and a number of other background
characteristics.
Questions have been carefully designed to ensure that they are understood
in the same way across countries. This is important because the European
countries are very diverse with respect to culture, language, immigration
history and immigration laws. For example, the word “immigrant” has been
avoided in the questionnaire because this word has diﬀerent connotations in
diﬀerent countries. Instead, the questionnaire refers to “people who come to
live in the country”.3 For more details on the design of the questionnaire,
see Card, Dustmann and Preston (2005).
In the empirical analysis below, we will use a number of diﬀerent vari-
2In some of the countries, however, sampling was not completely random, as, e.g.,
persons in households of diﬀerent sizes were not given exactly the same chance of selection.
We correct for this non-random sampling in the estimations below.
3We shall, however, use the word "immigrant" in this paper.
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ables capturing diﬀerent aspects of individual opinions about immigration.
The respondents have all been asked separately about their attitude towards
immigrants from rich and poor countries within and outside Europe, where
the possible answers were: "allow none to come and live here", "allow a
few", "allow some", and "allow many". This gives us four attitude variables:
ATrich_euro, ATpoor_euro, ATrich_noneuro and ATpoor_noneuro. From these, we
construct a variable, ATaverage, capturing the overall attitude towards immi-
gration as the simple average of the answers, when these are assigned values
between 1 and 4, where the value 1 corresponds to "allow none". Following
the literature, we also present results based on a binary response variable,
ATopen, which we define to take the value 1 if ATaverage exceeds 2.5 and the
value zero otherwise.
Simple descriptive statistics of these six variables are presented in Table
3.1.
[Insert Table 3.1 around here]
The total number of observations for the 16 countries used in the analy-
sis exceeds 30, 000, although the actual number of observations used in the
diﬀerent estimations is somewhat lower due to missing observations for some
of the involved variables.
We use several individual characteristics to explain the attitudes towards
immigration. Education is in the analysis captured by dummies for three
educational levels: primary education, secondary education and tertiary ed-
ucation.
Besides educational background, we also control for a number of other
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personal characteristics as listed in Table 3.2. Following the predictions of
the theoretical model, capital owners should be in favour of immigration. We
thus include dummies for being self-employed and being an employer with
five or more employees, as a broad and a narrow measure, respectively, of
being a capital owner. In addition, we include a dummy taking the value 1
if the person (or his or her spouse) is unemployed. We also include age, sex,
a dummy for being a first or second generation immigrant, and a dummy
for living in an urban area. Furthermore, there are two indicator variables
capturing whether the individual belongs to the political right or left. In
Section 4.3, we also use a dummy, poor, taking the value 1 if the household
belongs to the poorest 25% in the country; a dummy, recipient, for being
retired, permanently ill or handicapped, and hence to some degree dependent
on (public) transfers; a dummy indicating whether the individual is part of
the workforce; and a dummy, diﬃcult_get_job, taking the value one, if the
individual has answered that (s)he finds it diﬃcult or impossible to get a
similar or better job with another employer.
[Insert Table 3.2 around here]
Finally, in some of our empirical models below, we also control for the re-
spondent’s understanding of the economic implications of immigration. The
respondents have been asked to give their opinion on a number of statements
such as: "average wages/salaries generally brought down by immigrants" and
"immigrants harm economic prospects of the poor more than the rich". The
variables defined from these questions are presented in Section 4.3 below.
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4 Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis proceeds in three steps. In Section 4.1, we undertake a
simple test of whether people’s attitudes towards immigration are consistent
with the factor-proportions analysis model focusing on the relationship be-
tween education and general attitudes towards immigration. This approach
is in line with the existing studies. In Section 4.2, we provide a more powerful
test by distinguishing between people’s attitudes towards diﬀerent types of
immigration. Finally, in Section 4.3, we condition on pepole’s understanding
of the economic eﬀects of immigration, which provides a more direct test of
the importance of economic self-interest.
4.1 General Attitudes Towards Immigration
Existing studies have focused on the relationship between an individual’s
education and his or her general attitude towards immigration. The strong
positive relationship which has been found has been interpreted as evidence
in favour of attitudes being a result of economic self-interest, as immigrants
are assumed to compete with mainly less educated natives in the labour
market, see, e.g., Scheve and Slaughter (2001) and Mayda (2005).
We start by reexamining this general relationship, including the standard
controls used in the literature to capture a range of background characteris-
tics of the individual. As opposed to the existing studies, however, we also
include variables capturing other aspects of the factor-proportions analysis
model.
First, the theoretical model predicts that the return to capital increases
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as a result of immigration. We should therefore expect that employers tend
to favour immigration, and hence we include controls for being self-employed
and an employer with 5 or more employees, respectively. Second, since im-
migration intensifies competition for the currently unemployed, we should
expect these to be relatively more against immigration, and we therefore
include a control for unemployment in the household.
The resulting model is similar to those in, e.g., Scheve and Slaughter
(2001) and Mayda (2005) and can be specified as follows:
ATj,i = γjedui + αjempli + βjXi + εj,i (6)
where ATj,i is a response variable that gives individual i’s attitude towards
immigration, where a higher value indicates a more positive attitude. The
subscript j indexes diﬀerent aspects of people’s attitudes towards immigra-
tion, represented by diﬀerent response variables. edui is a vector of education
dummies for individual i, and empli is a vector of employment dummies, in-
cluding dummies for current unemployment, self-employment and employer
status. Finally, Xi is a vector of other background characteristics of indi-
vidual i, including measures of political orientation, age, sex, geographical
location (country dummies and urban/rural dummies), and ethnical back-
ground. εj,i is a random error, and γj, αj, and βj are the parameter vectors
associated with response variable j.
In the regressions in this first step, we use the two response variables:
ATaverage,i and ATopen,i, which we defined in Section 3. We interpret these
variables as capturing an individual’s general attitude towards immigration.
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While ATaverage,i can take on 13 diﬀerent values between 1 and 4, ATopen,i is
a binary variable. As a consequence, we use an ordered probit model to esti-
mate (6) when ATaverage,i is the dependent variable. When ATopen,i is used,
we use a standard probit model. Observations are weighted by population
weights to take account of the fact that small countries are oversampled in
the ESS, and by sampling weights to correct for non-random sampling within
the individual countries.
Table 4.1 presents the results from two probit and two ordered probit
regressions. Like the existing studies, we find that a higher level of education
is significantly related with a more positive attitude towards immigration.
Note that secondary is the omitted educational category. Hence, those hav-
ing only a primary education are the least positive towards further immigra-
tion, whereas people having a tertiary education are the most positive. This
relationship is very robust to changes in the specification of the model.4
[Insert Table 4.1 around here]
Moreover, we observe that the unemployed seem to oppose immigration
relatively more. This is also in accordance with the basic hypothesis. Perhaps
more surprisingly, neither the self-employed dummy nor the employer dummy
are significant in the regressions.
4For example, we also ran the regressions with each of the four variables used to con-
struct ATaverage,i without this aﬀecting the results.
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4.2 Attitudes Towards Diﬀerent Types of Immigration
Finding a positive eﬀect of education does not automatically imply that
attitudes are driven by economic self-interest. Alternatively, education may
be associated with a generally diﬀerent perception of and, therefore, attitude
towards immigration.
If the relationship between education and attitudes is caused by eco-
nomic self-interest, then education should influence people’s attitudes to-
wards diﬀerent types of immigration. According to the factor-proportions
analysis model, natives should oppose immigration of people representing
the same production factors as themselves. Thus, a more powerful test of
economic self-interest should analyse whether people with higher education
are relatively more positive towards low-skilled immigration, and vice versa.
Fortunately, the current data set provides an opportunity to perform such
a test by exploiting the information in the data set about people’s atti-
tudes towards immigration from diﬀerent types of countries, represented by
the variables ATrich_euro,i, ATpoor_euro,i, etc. Model (6) can be estimated
with each of these variables as the dependent variable, and according to the
factor-proportions analysis model, we should expect education to have a more
positive impact on attitudes towards immigration from poor countries, i.e.
γpoor_euro > γrich_euro, assuming that immigration from poor countries is less
skill intensive than immigration from rich countries. That immigrants from
poor countries are in fact less skilled than immigrants from rich countries
has been documented by Hainmueller and Hiscox (2005).
Instead of estimating two separate equations for the variables ATrich_euro,i
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and ATpoor_euro,i, we estimate the model in a first diﬀerence form:
∆ATeuro,i = ∆γeuro · edui +∆αeuro · empli +∆βeuro ·Xi +∆εeuro,i (7)
where ∆ATeuro,i = ATpoor_euro,i − ATrich_euro,i and ∆γeuro = γpoor_euro −
γrich_euro, etc. The diﬀerencing has the advantage that any unobserved indi-
vidual heterogeneity in the error terms is eliminated, which ensures consistent
estimates of the involved parameters. Furthermore, estimation of the diﬀer-
enced equation in (7) allows us to test directly whether ∆γeuro is positive,
i.e. whether γpoor_euro > γrich_euro.
Table 4.2 presents the results from the estimation of (7) using an ordered
probit model. Results from an identical model, based on attitudes towards
immigration from rich and poor non-European countries, ∆ATnon_euro,i, are
also contained in Table 4.2.
[Insert Table 4.2 around here]
We observe that people with a tertiary education are relatively more
positive towards immigration from poor countries than people with only a
secondary education. Although this is consistent with the factor-proportions
analysis model, it is only significant in the regressions for immigrants from
European countries. Furthermore, individuals with only a primary education
are also relatively more inclined towards immigration from low-income coun-
tries than people having a secondary (or tertiary!) education. This result is
highly significant in all regressions and goes against the factor-proportions
analysis model.
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It should be noted that the unemployed tend to favour immigration from
rich countries more, which is in accordance with the factor-proportions analy-
sis model. Similarly, the self-employed seem to prefer immigration from richer
countries, although only significant in one of the regressions.
In sum, however, the results of this section do not lend much support
for the hypothesis that the relationsship between education and general at-
titudes from Section 4.1 reflects economic self-interest in the labour market.
In fact, the finding that the least skilled are relatively more in favour of im-
migration from poor countries is directly at odds with it. In this respect, it is
interesting to note that Dustmann and Preston (2004a) also find that labour
market implications of immigration do not seem to play much of a role for
the attitudes of less educated individuals towards immigration in the UK.
Now, does this mean that economic self-interest does not matter? Not
necessarily. An alternative explanation is that people simply perceive the
eﬀects of immigration diﬀerently. We consider this possibility in the final
step.
4.3 Conditional Attitudes Towards Immigration
The approach taken above implicitly assumes that people perceive the eco-
nomic consequences of immigration according to a specific version of the
factor-proportions analysis model. As a consequence, when testing whether
economic self-interest matters for people’s attitudes, we are in fact testing a
composite hypothesis, namely: i) that people’s attitudes towards immigra-
tion are determined by economic self-interest; and ii) that people believe in
17
the implications of the factor-proportions analysis model outlined in Section
2. Thus, when we reject this composite hypothesis, it may just be because
people do not (or cannot) analyse the economic consequences of immigration
according to the factor-proportions analysis model. As argued in Section
2, the labour market implications of immigration according to the factor-
proportions analysis model are not even unambiguous. More importantly,
however, people do in fact have very diﬀerent perceptions of the economic
consequences of immigration, as we shall show below.
Furthermore, other economic implications may work in the opposite di-
rection of those stemming from the labour market. As an example, although
highly educated should favour low-skilled immigration out of labour market
concerns, they may oppose exactly the same type of immigration due to their
expected consequences for the public budget — something which in particular
may harm those with the highest educations as they pay the majority of
taxes. A similar point has been stressed by Dustmann and Preston (2004a)
and Facchini and Mayda (2006). Thus, using the level of education may not
appropriately identify those exposed to the consequences of immigration.
How should we deal with these problems? First, we exploit the fact that
the ESS contains a number of questions about the perceived consequences
of immigration. We can use the answers to these questions to condition on
people’s perceptions of the economic consequences of immigration. More
precisely, on the basis of these questions, we construct a number of dummy
variables which we interact with relevant characteristics of the individuals.
As an example, we interact the answer to the question "Immigrants take more
jobs away than they create" with a dummy for unemployment of the respon-
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dent (or the spouse), and include the resulting variable in the regression.
Hence, instead of asking whether unemployed are more against immigration,
we ask whether unemployed are more against immigration — given that they
perceive immigration to reduce jobs. If perceptions vary across individuals,
this constitutes a more appropriate test of whether economic self-interest
matters for people’s attitudes towards immigration than the approach taken
in the previous sections. Second, by using a range of other background vari-
ables than education, we are better able to identify those perceived to be
(negatively) aﬀected by immigration.
In the following, we use the answers to five diﬀerent questions about the
perceived consequences of immigration. The questions and the associated
distributions of answers are listed in Table 4.3 below.
[Insert Table 4.3 around here]
The Table clearly illustrates that the perceived consequences of immigra-
tion diﬀer markedly across individuals. As an example, when asked about
whether average wages are generally brought down by immigrants, more than
37% agree while equally many disagree. The answers to the other four ques-
tions are almost equally diversified.
In the following, we recode the answers to these questions into five dummy
variables, wages_down, bad_for_poor, fill_jobs, take_jobs_away, and take
_more_out, each taking the value 1 if an individual agrees with the statement
in question. In Table 4.4, we then provide estimates of the model in (6)
using the same variables as in Section 4.1. In addition, in columns 1-10
of Table 4.4, we in turn include the five dummy variables interacted with
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relevant background characteristics. Furthermore, the last two columns (11
and 12) provide estimates of the "full" model where all interactions have
been included.
In the first two regressions in Table 4.4, we have included the variable
bad_for_poor interacted with a dummy for being poor. The individual vari-
ables, bad_for_poor and poor, are also included separately in the regressions
to avoid that the interacted variable simply picks up the eﬀects of one (or
both) of these variables. While these variables in themselves turn out to have
a negative impact on attitudes towards immigration, the coeﬃcient to the
interacted variable is also significantly negative at a 5% level in the ordered
probit regression (column 2). Hence, not only do poor people and those who
find immigration to be bad for the poor oppose immigration more than oth-
ers, it also seems to be the case that among those who perceive immigration
to be bad for the poor, the poor are relatively more opposed to immigration.
These results are preserved in the full model in columns 11-12. We interpret
this as evidence in favour of a role for economic self-interest.
The following two regressions include the variable take_more_out inter-
acted with recipient. Although, the coeﬃcient to the interacted variables are
insignificant in these regressions, they both become significantly negative at
the 5% level in the full model. This indicates that among those who believe
that immigrants take more out than they put in, in terms of taxes and ser-
vices from the public sector, those who are likely to depend on social benefits
are more opposed to immigration. Again, we interpret this as an indication
of economic self-interest.
Columns 5 and 6 report the results of the regressions where the variables
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wages_down and workforce have been included, both separately and inter-
acted. The coeﬃcient to the interacted variable is significantly negative in
both regressions (1% and 5% level, respectively) as well as in the full model
in columns 11-12. This means that among those who believe that wages are
driven down by immigrants, members of the workforce are more negative to-
wards immigration than those outside the workforce. In other words, those
who are likely to be hurt by lower wages tend to be against immigration if
they believe that immigration drives down wages.
In the following two regressions (columns 7 and 8), the variables fill_jobs
and employer are included as are the interaction of these two variables. In
these regressions, the coeﬃcient to the interacted variable is positive, al-
though not significant. Thus, while those who believe immigrants to fill jobs
where there are shortages of workers are more positive towards immigra-
tion in general, we cannot confirm that among these, employers tend to be
more positive. We also ran these regressions using self-employed instead of
employer, but with the same results.
In columns 9 and 10, the variables take_jobs_away and diﬃcult_get_job
are included. The idea is that the latter variable should catch those who
would suﬀer most from a reduction in the available jobs. Another indicator
of this could be the currently unemployed. Hence, in columns 9 and 10 both
of these are interacted with the variable take_jobs_away. The coeﬃcients
to the interacted variables are significantly negative in both regressions, and
even more so in the full model. This strongly indicates that among those who
believe that immigrants take jobs away, those who are likely to be hurt by this
are more opposed to immigration. Again a clear indication of economic self-
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interest playing an important role for people’s attitude towards immigration.
In sum, there appears to be significant evidence of economic self-interest
playing a role for individual attitudes towards immigration, as all the coef-
ficients to the interacted variables in the full model have the expected sign
and only one of them is insignificant.
[Insert Table 4.4 around here]
To sum up, people’s beliefs concerning the economic implications of im-
migration vary considerably, and our results confirm that it is important to
condition on these perceptions in order to determine whether economic self-
interest plays a role for people’s attitudes towards immigration. Doing this,
we find evidence of economic self-interest playing a role for those who believe
that immigration disproportionately hurts the poor, puts public expenditures
under pressure, take jobs away and/or lowers wages, as those most likely to
be harmed by these eﬀects are relatively more opposed to immigration.
5 Conclusion
Are people’s attitudes towards immigration driven by economic self-interest?
Existing studies have disagreed on this. A number of studies have found a
very significant (and positive) relationship between an individual’s attitude
towards immigration and his or her educational background, see, e.g., Scheve
and Slaughter (2001) and Mayda (2005). Based on the factor-proportions
analysis model, this relationship has been interpreted as supporting the hy-
pothesis that attitudes are — at least in part — determined by economic self-
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interest. Recently, however, this interpretation has been questioned by, e.g.,
Dustmann and Preston (2004a) and Hainmueller and Hiscox (2005).
In this paper, we have re-examined the role of economic self-interest in
shaping people’s attitudes towards immigration, using data from the Euro-
pean Social Survey 2002/2003. While we — like the existing studies — found
a strong positive relationship between education and the general attitude
towards immigration, we questioned whether this is a result of economic
self-interest.
First, we provided a more powerful test of the importance of economic
self-interest in shaping people’s attitudes towards immigration. According to
the factor-proportions analysis model, we should expect the more educated
to be relatively more in favour of less skilled immigration. We do not find
that this is the case and therefore reject the hypothesis that the positive
relationship between education and attitudes towards immigration is a result
of economic self-interest in the labour market.
Second, we argued that an appropriate test of economic self-interest
should condition on people’s perceptions of the economic consequences of
immigration, as these perceptions vary substantially across individuals. Fur-
thermore, by using other background characteristics than education, we should
be better able to identify those individuals likely to be aﬀected economically
by immigration. Doing this, we found that among those who believe that
immigration disproportionately harms the poor, the poor are more opposed
to immigration. Among those who believe that immigration lowers wages,
those in the workforce are significantly more negative of further immigration.
Among those who believe that immigrants take jobs away, those who are un-
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employed or who find it diﬃcult to find a new job if losing their current job
are more opposed to immigration. Finally, among those who believe immi-
grants to place a burden on the public budget, those who are likely recipients
of social benefits appear to be most against immigration.
In sum, using this more direct test, we find strong evidence of a role for
economic self-interest in shaping people’s attitudes towards immigration.
24
References
[1] Boeri, T. and H. Brücker (2005): "Why are Europeans so Tough on
Migrants?", Economic Policy, 20, 629-703.
[2] Card, D., C. Dustmann and I. Preston (2005): "Understanding attitudes
to immigration: The migration and minority module of the first European
Social Survey", CReAM Discussion Paper No. 03/05.
[3] Dustmann, C. and I. Preston (2004a): "Racial and Economic Factors in
Attitudes to Immigration", CReAM Discussion Paper No. 1/04.
[4] Dustmann, C. and I. Preston (2004b): "Is Immigration Good or Bad for
the Economy? Analysis of Attitudinal Responses", Research in Labor
Economics, forthcoming.
[5] Facchini, G. and A.M. Mayda (2006): "Individual Attitudes towards Im-
migrants: Welfare-State Determinants Across Countries", Working pa-
per, Georgetown University.
[6] Hainmueller, J. andM.J. Hiscox (2005): "Educated Preferences: Explain-
ing Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe", working paper.
[7] Krusell, P., L.E. Ohanian, J.-V. Rios-Rull, and G.L. Violante (2000):
"Capital-Skill Complementarity and Inequality: A Macroeconomic
Analysis", Econometrica, 1029-1054.
[8] Mayda, A.M. (2005): "Who is Against Immigration? A Cross-Country
Investigation of Individual Attitudes towards Immigrants", Review of
Economics and Statistics, forthcoming.
25
[9] Scheve, K. F. and M. J. Slaughter (2001): "Labor Market Competition
and Individual Preferences over Immigration Policy", Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics, 83, 133-145.
26
Table 3.1: Attitude variables, summary statistics
Variables Mean Min Max # obs.
AT_poor_euro 2.53938 1 4 27070
AT_rich_euro 2.57952 1 4 26867
AT_poor_noneuro 2.46677 1 4 26951
AT_rich_noneuro 2.48558 1 4 26840
AT_average 2.52014 1 4 26505
AT_open 0.46089 0 1 26505
Table 3.2: Explanatory variables, summary statistics
Variables Mean Min Max # obs.
Primary 0.42402 0 1 28081
Secondary 0.38168 0 1 28081
Tertiary 0.19430 0 1 28081
Age 48.85353 15 102 28060
Self-employed 0.09206 0 1 28166
Employer 0.01868 0 1 28166
Unemployed 0.04958 0 1 28237
Sex (male=1) 0.47424 0 1 28199
Immigrant 0.14876 0 1 28213
Urban 0.32849 0 1 28098
Right 0.34459 0 1 24882
Left 0.31975 0 1 24882
Poor 0.24839 0 1 22763
Recipient 0.24799 0 1 28166
Workforce 0.59018 0 1 18166
Difficult_get_job 0.22818 0 1 28237
Table 4.1: General Attitudes Towards Immigration
Model: oprobit probit oprobit probit
Variables\LHS var: ATaverage ATopen ATaverage ATopen
Age -0.00994 -0.00721 -0.00962 -0.00672
(-4.53)*** (-2.62)*** (-4.41)*** (-2.45)**
Age^2 0.00003 0.00000 0.00003 -0.00001
(1.54) (-0.09) (1.39) (-0.29)
Left 0.26899 0.23825 0.26837 0.23695
(16.40)*** (11.58)*** (16.37)*** (11.52)***
Right -0.00914 -0.01238 -0.00839 -0.01047
(-0.54) (-0.58) (-0.50) (-0.49)
Male 0.07926 0.08326 0.08150 0.08668
(5.86)*** (4.89)*** (6.07)*** (5.13)***
Urban 0.09611 0.11771 0.09578 0.11759
(6.39)*** (6.20)*** (6.37)*** (6.20)***
Immigrant 0.26069 0.25458 0.26138 0.25514
(12.91)*** (9.92)*** (12.94)*** (9.95)***
Primary -0.26031 -0.27045 -0.26037 -0.27123
(-15.28)*** (-12.70)*** (-15.28)*** (-12.73)***
Tertiary 0.40543 0.42406 0.40626 0.42550
(21.45)*** (17.79)*** (21.50)*** (17.86)***
Unemployed -0.13964 -0.13353 -0.14251 -0.13784
(-5.02)*** (-3.84)*** (-5.14)*** (-3.97)***
Self-employed 0.03616 0.03462
(1.53) (1.16)
Employer 0.03749 -0.05957
(0.72) (-0.91)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
# obs. 23,970 23,970 23,970 23,970
Pseudo R2 0.039 0.086 0.039 0.086
Log likelihood -48106.29 -15174.01 -48107.21 -15174.27
Notes:
t-values in parentheses
* Significant at 10% level
** Significant at 5% level
*** Significant at 1% level
Table 4.2: Relative Attitudes Towards Immigration
Model: oprobit oprobit oprobit oprobit
Variables\LHS var: ∆ATeuro ∆ATeuro ∆ATnoneuro ∆ATnoneuro
Age -0.00459 -0.00550 -0.01082 -0.01117
(-1.90)* (-2.28)** (-4.41)*** (-4.58)***
Age^2 0.00003 0.00004 0.00010 0.00010
(1.23) (1.67)* (4.07)*** (4.24)***
Left 0.10692 0.10874 0.08108 0.08199
(5.91)*** (6.02)*** (4.42)*** (4.48)***
Right -0.07821 -0.08069 -0.12055 -0.12217
(-4.18)*** (-4.32)*** (-6.35)*** (-6.44)***
Male -0.15363 -0.16007 -0.13901 -0.14143
(-10.25)*** (-10.76)*** (-9.15)*** (-9.38)***
Urban -0.02814 -0.02737 -0.00196 -0.00188
(-1.69)* (-1.65)* (-0.12) (-0.11)
Immigrant 0.04665 0.04479 0.07516 0.07485
(2.09)** (2.01)** (3.33)*** (3.31)***
Primary 0.09660 0.09691 0.08450 0.08522
(5.12)*** (5.13)*** (4.42)*** (4.45)***
Tertiary 0.05216 0.04979 0.00157 0.00057
(2.50)** (2.39)** (0.07) (0.03)
Unemployed -0.11325 -0.10503 -0.04478 -0.04175
(-3.66)*** (-3.40)*** (-1.43) (-1.34)
Self-employed -0.09455 -0.01729
(-3.60)*** (-0.65)
Employer -0.05979 0.07909
(-1.04) (1.35)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
# obs. 25,057 25,057 25,057 25,057
Pseudo R2 0.012 0.012 0.014 0.014
Log likelihood -20945.45 -20951.40 -19990.21 -19989.50
Notes:
t-values in parentheses
* Significant at 10% level
** Significant at 5% level
*** Significant at 1% level
Table 4.3: Perceptions of the Consequenses of Immigration
Average wages/salaries Immigrants harm Immigrants help Immigrants take jobs Taxes and services: 
generally brought economic prospects of to fill jobs where there away in country?2 immigrants take out more 
down by immigrants?1 the poor more than the rich?1 are shortages of workers?1 than they put in?3
Agree 37.46 49.01 63.81 37.21 49.16
Neutral 23.13 21.95 18.29 34.45 28.46
Disagree 37.42 29.04 17.90 28.33 22.38
Notes:
1: The answers "agree strongly" and "agree" have been pooled into the "Agree" category,  the answer "neither" corresponds to the "Neutral" category;
    while the answers "disagree" and "strongly disagree" have been pooled into the "Disagree" category.
2: The original survey question was "Immigrants take jobs away in country or create new jobs?" with possible answers from 0 to 10.
    Answers from 0 to 4 are collected in the category "Agree", "Neutral" represents the answer 5, while answers from 6 to 10 are collected in "Disagree".
3: The original survey questions was "Taxes and services:immigrants take out more than they put in or less?" with possible answers from 0 to 10.
    Answers from 0 to 4 are collected in the category "Agree", "Neutral" represents the answer 5, while answers from 6 to 10 are collected in "Disagree".
Table 4.4: Conditional Attitudes Towards Immigration
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Model: probit oprobit probit oprobit probit oprobit probit oprobit probit oprobit probit oprobit
Variables\LHS var: ATopen ATaverage ATopen ATaverage ATopen ATaverage ATopen ATaverage ATopen ATaverage ATopen ATaverage
Age -0.00165 -0.00562 -0.00880 -0.01240 -0.00395 -0.00748 -0.00684 -0.01009 -0.00755 -0.01100 0.00123 -0.00579
(-0.50) (-2.16)** (-3.03)*** (-5.43)*** (-1.36) (-3.27)*** (-2.46)** (-4.58)*** (-2.64)*** (-4.88)*** (0.34) (-2.09)**
Age^2 -0.00003 0.00002 0.00002 0.00006 0.00004 0.00001 -0.00001 0.00003 0.00000 0.00004 -0.00008 0.00001
(-1.02) -(0.62) -(0.59) (2.61)*** (-1.19) (0.41) (-0.48) -1.2800000 (-0.13) (1.78)* (-2.03)** (0.28)
Left 0.22760 0.25752 0.22217 0.25121 0.23318 0.26499 0.23117 0.26239 0.24201 0.27507 0.21960 0.25341
(9.63)*** (13.86)*** (10.50)*** (15.06)*** (11.00)*** (15.86)*** (11.11)*** (15.88)*** (11.51)*** (16.58)*** (8.85)*** (13.24)***
Right 0.01828 0.01727 0.01954 0.01812 -0.00283 -0.00150 -0.01203 -0.00807 0.01152 0.01249 0.05951 0.05405
-(1.15) -(0.90) (0.90) (1.06) (-0.13) (-0.09) (-0.56) (-0.48) (0.53) (0.73) (2.33)** (2.73)***
Male 0.06361 0.06523 0.09968 0.09583 0.12391 0.10981 0.09347 0.08864 0.08972 0.08719 0.11306 0.10492
(3.25)*** (4.26)*** (5.66)*** (6.93)*** (6.92)*** (7.82)*** (5.46)*** (6.55)*** (5.14)*** (6.36)*** (5.26)*** (6.35)***
Urban 0.09081 0.08418 0.10045 0.08174 0.13034 0.10545 0.11723 0.09593 0.11437 0.09538 0.09629 0.08594
(4.21)*** (4.99)*** (5.15)*** (5.35)*** (6.68)*** (6.90)*** (6.10)*** (6.33)*** (5.90)*** (6.27)*** (4.26)*** (4.95)***
Immigrant 0.19344 0.23393 0.20301 0.21316 0.26334 0.26572 0.24055 0.24715 0.20691 0.21890 0.17192 0.20432
(6.71)*** (10.44)*** (7.70)*** (10.39)*** (9.97)*** (12.92)*** (9.29)*** (12.17)*** (7.88)*** (10.68)*** (5.67)*** (8.81)***
Primary -0.23124 -0.24244 -0.24940 -0.24361 -0.23179 -0.23129 -0.26140 -0.25370 -0.23573 -0.22461 -0.18382 -0.20096
(-9.32)*** (-12.36)*** (-11.42)*** (-14.10)*** (-10.52)*** (-13.28)*** (-12.14)*** (-14.80)*** (-10.81)*** (-13.02)*** (-7.04)*** (-9.91)***
Tertiary 0.39020 0.35651 0.02444 0.35877 0.35855 0.34178 0.41170 0.39189 0.36546 0.34764 0.30689 0.27592
(14.54)*** (16.96)*** (15.42)*** (18.70)*** (14.65)*** (17.79)*** (17.11)*** (20.62)*** (14.99)*** (18.17)*** (10.93)*** (12.75)***
Unemployed -0.08162 -0.09981 -0.13094 -0.15024 -0.08861 -0.11626 -0.12581 -0.14065 -0.06323 -0.06118 0.04775 0.04327
(-2.20)** (-3.44)*** (-3.99)*** (-5.81)*** (-2.65)*** (-4.44)*** (-3.89)*** (-5.48)*** (-1.44) (-1.77)* (0.92) (1.09)
Self-employed 0.08010 0.07344 0.02139 0.02541 0.02143 0.01972 0.01533 0.02325
(2.23)** (2.64)*** (0.69) (1.05) (0.68) (0.81) (0.49) (0.95)
Bad_for_poor -0.55304 -0.53089 -0.31438 -0.29943
(-25.20)*** (-30.14)*** (-12.70)*** (-15.30)***
Poor -0.13795 -0.07497 -0.14940 -0.06663
(-3.84)*** (-2.63)*** (-3.93)*** (-2.24)**
Bad_for_poor x Poor -0.03615 -0.08894 -0.02052 -0.09308
(-0.75) (-2.37)** (-0.40) (-2.36)**
Take_more_out -0.53048 -0.52889 -0.29675 -0.29035
(-26.23)*** (-32.69)*** (-12.00)*** (-14.93)***
Recipient -0.03987 -0.03266 -0.00077 -0.00263
(-1.08) (-1.12) (-0.02) (-0.07)
Take_more_out x Recipient -0.02616 -0.02227 -0.10410 -0.08789
(-0.63) (-0.69) (-2.11)** (-2.32)**
Wages_down -0.45785 -0.46354 -0.23617 -0.21872
(-15.92)*** (-20.51)*** (-6.65)*** (-7.97)***
Workforce 0.01794 0.01140 -0.00256 0.00713
(0.67) -0.54 (-0.07) -0.25
Wages_down x workforce -0.14415 -0.06850 -0.13518 -0.07622
(-3.91)*** (-2.39)** (-3.09)*** (-2.27)**
Fill_jobs 0.32983 0.33665 0.21964 0.22099
(18.08)*** (23.21)*** (9.90)*** (12.87)***
Employer -0.29035 -0.09897 -0.11705 -0.03948
(-2.20)** (-0.97) (-1.34) (-0.59)
Fill_jobs x Employer 0.24807 0.11265 0.06293 0.04843
(1.63) (0.95) (1.23) (1.25)
Take_jobs_away -0.48281 -0.49945 -0.21295 -0.23825
(-22.07)*** (-28.76)*** (-7.71)*** (-11.05)***
Difficult_get_job 0.00179 0.00648 -0.00366 0.00599
(0.07) (0.31) (-0.11) (0.24)
Take_jobs_away x Difficult_get_job -0.10538 -0.05870 -0.10267 -0.09779
(-2.54)** (-1.80)* (-2.13)** (-2.64)***
Take_jobs_away x Unemployed -0.12649 -0.14474 -0.17192 -0.22296
(1.94)* (-2.83)*** (-2.22)** (-3.79)***
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# obs. 18,822 18,822 23,335 23,335 23,222 23,222 23,669 23,669 23,544 23,544 17,916 17,916
Pseudo R2 0.117 0.054 0.094 0.044 0.115 0.051 0.097 0.045 0.090 0.041 0.143 0.067
Log likelihood -11510.35 -37245.17 -14655.53 -46663.61 -14244.71 -46008.26 -14810.64 -47189.19 -14842.69 -47169.63 -10642.12 -35066.36
Notes: t-values in parentheses. * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level
